Abstract: Long waiting times are a common feature and a major concern in many public health care systems. They are often characterized as inefficient because they are a burden to patients without generating any gains for providers. There is an ongoing debate in Germany regarding the preferential treatment given to private health insurance (PHI) holders while statutory health insurance (SHI) holders face continuously increasing waiting times. In order to tackle this problem in the outpatient sector, Germany initiated a reform in 2015 which was aimed at providing SHI holders with appointments within an acceptable time frame. We exploit longitudinal experimental data to examine waiting times for six elective outpatient treatments in Germany for PHI and SHI holders before and after the reform. We find a considerable difference in waiting times favoring private patients. For SHI holders, waiting times remained stable over time (27.5 days in 2014, 30.7 days in 2016, Δ 3.2 days, p-value = 0.889) while PHI holders experienced a significant improvement (13.5 days in 2014; 7.8 days in 2016; Δ 5.7 days, p-value = 0.002). The results indicate that even after the reform there is still an unequal access to elective outpatient treatment depending on the patient's insurance status.
Introduction
Long waiting times for medical treatment are a major concern in many public health care systems (Cullis et al. 2000; Siciliani and Hurst 2005; Siciliani and Verzulli 2009) . They are inefficient and therefore an undesirable form of rationing, because they diminish utility gains from consultation and treatment (Lindsay and Feigenbaum 1984) and they put costs on patients without providing benefits for providers (Siciliani and Hurst 2005) . Over the past decades many countries devised administrative measures to reduce waiting times. The measures included higher spending, waiting-time target schemes and incentive mechanisms that reward higher levels of activity (for an overview see Siciliani and Hurst 2005; Viberg et al. 2013; Siciliani et al. 2014) .
In Germany, the ongoing debate about increasing waiting times focuses on equity concerns rather than on efficiency aspects. In particular, the division of the insurance system into a public and a private part and its impact on access to outpatient health care is a critical issue in the political and scientific debate (e. g. Lungen et al. 2008; Sauerland et al. 2009; Schwierz et al. 2011; Roll et al. 2012 ). More precisely, there is an increasing concern in Germany about discrimination in access to medical care by insurance type (e. g. Lungen et al. 2008; Roll et al. 2012) .
The German health insurance system consists of two key components: the Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) and the Private Health Insurance (PHI). There are financial benefits for physicians to treat private patients which provide strong incentives to offer preferential treatment for PHI compared to SHI policy holders. For example, reimbursement rates for treating PHI holders are about three times higher (Niehaus 2009; Finkenstädt and Niehaus 2013) . The preferential treatment of private patients includes offering appointments to PHI holders with a higher priority. Lungen et al. (2008) , for example, analyze waiting times for five elective treatments and find that SHI patients have to wait about three times longer for an appointment than PHI patients. In some cases, waiting times for SHI patients substantially exceeded a month.
In 2015, policy-makers initiated a reform which was intended to tackle the problem of increasing waiting times in the outpatient sector. Upon a patient's request, newly implemented service hotlines try to find an appointment at a practice that lies within an acceptable distance from the patient's place of residence. Furthermore, the appointment date should be within 4 weeks. If the reform is effective, it has the potential to reduce waiting times. A more even allocation of appointments could avoid excessive waiting times by shifting patients from highly frequented practices to less frequented ones.
Against this background this study has three objectives: First, it aims to assess the waiting times for elective outpatient treatments in a big urban region; second, it examines whether PHI holders obtain quicker appointments than SHI patients; third, it measures waiting times for PHI and SHI holders before and after the reform to evaluate its effectiveness.
We conducted an experiment whereby a team of trained research assistants called 163 specialist practices in the region of Cologne, Leverkusen and Bonn. The experiment was carried out for the first time in February 2014, and was repeated in August 2016. The research assistants pretended to be patients in need of medical care. Depending on the specialist, they requested one of the following six outpatient elective treatments: eye examination, audiometry, allergy test, pulmonary function test, MRT of the knee or gastroscopy. In order to provide an exogenous variation of the insurance status, the callers were randomly assigned to either PHI or SHI status.
One limitation of our experiment is that different periods in the year before and after the reform were used to collect waiting time data. In consequence, we cannot rule out that seasonality (e. g. that demand and supply may factors may differ in winter month compared to summer month) impacts our results.
1 Thus, the issue of seasonality of waiting times, which we explore in more detail in the discussion section, might not allow us to assess the causal impact of the reform on waiting times. Notwithstanding this limitation, our paper contributes to the scarce empirical literature on waiting times in the German health care market (Lungen et al. 2008; Schwierz et al. 2011; Roll et al. 2012; Sundmacher and Kopetsch 2013) . We employ an experimental design that avoids selection biases, recall biases and response biases in measuring waiting times. These problems are a constant challenge for studies that are based on patients surveys (e. g. Asplin et al. 2005) . Lungen et al. (2008) use a similar approach to analyze waiting times, evaluating the same region and identical treatments. In addition to this study, we were able to collect data over several points in time, which allows us to examine time trends and the reform's impact. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of this kind in Germany.
Moreover, this paper contributes to the broad empirical economic literature which uses waiting times as a measure of access to medical care (e. g. Cullis et al. 2000; Sundmacher and Kopetsch 2013; Viberg et al. 2013; Siciliani et al. 2014) . Several studies provide evidence that waiting times for elective treatments are strongly associated with insurance type and financial incentives (e. g. Asplin et al. 2005; Siciliani et al. 2014) . The German system, with its separation between PHI and SHI patients, is well suited to study how insurance types and financial incentives impact access to medical care.
The next section describes the institutional settings of the German health insurance system and provides an overview of the reform. Following, Section 3 explains the data, the study design and the empirical strategy. Section 4 provides the results and Section 5 concludes.
Institutional settings 2.1 The german insurance system
The German health insurance system is characterized by a parallel existence of public/statutory and private health insurance. While for large parts of society SHI is obligatory, certain groups have the possibility to opt out of the SHI and into the PHI system. In 2016, this applies to civil servants, self-employed and employees with an annual income above the threshold of 56,250 Euros (Bundesregierung 2016) . In 2013, approximately 12 % were privately insured (BMG -Bundesministerium für Gesundheit 2015). Differences also exist regarding the determination of insurance fees. SHI providers base patient's fees on the patient's income. In contrast, PHI fees are set according to an individual risk assessment.
The treatment of PHI patients has a number of financial advantages for physicians in the outpatient sector. For outpatient care, reimbursement for treating PHI holders is about three times higher than for SHI holders (Niehaus 2009; Finkenstädt and Niehaus 2013) and the SHI benefit package is less generous than the PHI one (Roll et al. 2012 ). Moreover, for SHI patients physicians are subjected to budget limits on an individual level, the so-called standard service volume (German: Regelleistungsvolumen -RLV). The RLV defines the maximum quantity of services that a physician can charge per quarter without any discount. Services performed beyond the budget limits are reimbursed at a much lower rate (Salm and Wübker 2017) . Moreover, PHI holders have a higher income and thus face higher opportunity costs of waiting times (Johannesson et al. 1998 ). This may lead to an increased willingness among private patients to change physicians based on the length of waiting times, which in turn increases physicians' incentives for preferential treatment.
The reform
In order to reduce long waiting times, policymakers initiated in 2015 a reform that was subsequently introduced on January 25, 2016. The initiative was part of a law aimed at improving medical service provision comprehensively (Deutscher Bundestag 2015) . Service hotlines were installed which patients could contact if they were not able to obtain an appointment via the usual channels within a reasonable time. Called upon, the station must allocate an appointment to the patient within a week, with no longer than weeks waiting time and with an acceptable distance from the patient's place of residence. However, this applies only if the general practitioner has issued a medical referral indicating high urgency. An acceptable distance is defined as the distance to the next specialist of the required kind plus additional 30 minutes by public transport. In case of certain specialists, 2 a travelling time of 60 minutes is considered acceptable. Neither wishes for a certain appointment time nor preferences for a particular specialist are taken into account. If the service station cannot find an appropriate appointment, an outpatient-treatment in a hospital must be arranged for the patient. This reform aims to optimize the allocation of patients. Practices in less demanded regions might still have appointments available that are not fully utilized, while specialists in highly demanded areas are not able to satisfy the demand. In urban areas with a considerable number of specialists, time and money constraints prevent patients from inquiring about all the available appointments in different practices. The service stations are intended to overcome this inefficiency and find an acceptable appointment on behalf of the patient. In addition, a prioritization is given according to the urgency status.
This reform is specifically directed towards patients with certain indications that were not able to receive an appointment within a reasonable time on their own. Those indications do not include routine check-ups or bagatelle examinations but they include elective treatments if a specialist treatment is strongly indicated. Due to this narrow target group, it is likely that the reform will not directly affect the majority of patients. However, if the reform is successful, we can expect an indirect effect. An improved resource allocation by matching patients to free specialist appointments can reduce the backlog of practices and therefore decrease excess demand as well as excess capacities. If a patient requires an appointment at a practice that used to be highly frequented, he might receive an appointment quicker as other patients have been mediated towards less frequented practices by the service hotlines. However, if a patient requests an appointment with a formerly less frequented practice, he might have to accept a longer waiting time since free capacities have been taking patients that used the service hotlines. Hence, the overall effect is unclear but depends on the amount of excess capacities. In case of an effective reform, we would expect a less unequal distribution of waiting times across practices after the reform, i. e. a decrease in the variation of waiting times over time.
As the placement is not limited to a certain kind of insurance, SHI holders as well as PHI holders can take advantage of the reform. However, under the assumption of preferential treatment of private patients, it is reasonable to assume that only few PHI holders are not able to get an appointment within 4 weeks. We therefore expect that mainly publicly insured patients will approach the service hotlines. However, if the reform improves resource allocation, practices will have more resources in the form of appointments at hand. As physicians face incentives to offer preferential treatment to private patients (Roll et al. 2012) , those capacities could be used to provide PHI patients with appointments on short call. Yet, the extent of this mechanism depends on the share of PHI patients in a particular practice. If freed capacities exceed demand (on short notice) by PHI patients, SHI holders would benefit. While the reform might have a negative effect on general waiting times, the insurance-specific effect highly depends on the behavior of physicians and hence cannot be fully predicted by theoretical considerations.
Methods

Experimental design
The research design follows closely the approach taken by Lungen et al. (2008) , which allows us to compare results and put them into the context of a longer time horizon. The experiment was carried out in the area of Cologne, Leverkusen and Bonn: an urban, high-density region in Germany. In contrast to the average German population density of 227 residents per square meter, Cologne, Leverkusen and Bonn are densely populated with on average 2.453 residents per square meter. While generally there are 175 practitioners per 100.000 residents in Germany, the number of physicians in the area mentioned above amounts to 266 per 100.000 residents. Hence, we would expect that access to outpatient treatments might be better on average and therefore waiting times could be shorter than in less urban regions.
In the framework of this experiment, we consider six different types of specialists with treatments that are frequently required as outpatient treatments but are not considered emergency treatments. We focus on the following treatments (specialist fields): eye examination (ophthalmology), audiometry (otorhinolaryngology), allergy test (allergology), pulmonary function test (pulmonology), MRT of the knee (diagnostic radiology) and gastroscopy (gastroenterology). The sample includes all available specialists of the fields mentioned above that are assumed to offer the listed treatments. Table 1 summarizes the choice of specialists and treatments as well as the number of contacted and included practices, with respect to the insurance status. Inclusion rates are high with over 80 percent in 2014 and above 70 percent in 2016.
Physicians were called by telephone and an appointment for the relevant elective treatment was requested. Telephone numbers were taken from public directories. The first wave of telephone calls took place between February 18 and 25, 2014. The second wave was carried out between August 24 and October 14, 2016. Similar to Lungen et al. (2008) , during the first wave each physician received a call in which the insurance status was mentioned. The caller's insurance status was assigned randomly. In the second wave (2016), a refinement was made to further ensure the absence of unobserved heterogeneity. Each 
Notes: MRT = Magnetic resonance tomography/SHI = statutory health insurance/PHI = private health insurance.
Waiting Times for Outpatient Treatment physician was called a second time for an appointment with the reversed insurance status. As a result, in the second wave for each physician an appointment for a SHI and a PHI holder were made. Both appointments are directly comparable since practice-specific effects that influence the length of waiting time do not play a role here. Except for the insurance status, all other conditions were equal and a sufficient time between the calls was maintained. 4 This double call design enables us to check for unobserved heterogeneity without losing the comparability of the results to the first wave and to the former studies. This refined design leads to an increase of contacts in 2016. While all available specialists have been contacted in both waves, the number of contacts roughly doubles since each specialist has been called twice. Minor deviations in the number of specialists may arise for newly opened or closed practices in 2016.
In each wave a different research assistant executed all telephone requests. Both assistants followed a set of guidelines to ensure comparable conditions for the requests. During the call, no reason for exceptional treatment was given nor was urgency indicated. If a receptionist asked for the specific health insurance company, a major insurance provider of the respective kind was named. In case the receptionist requested the name of the general practitioner, a fictitious name was provided with the argument of having recently moved to the area. All telephone calls were ended with the cancellation of the pretense appointments. Thus, no appointment slots were occupied. Calls were executed on working days during office hours. The day of contact was documented for both waves; the time of contact was only recorded in the second wave. For this reason, we could not include the time of day as control variable. Yet, as calls were assigned randomly, there is little reason to believe that difference in waiting times between holders of different insurance statuses could be significantly impacted by the time or day of contact. Nevertheless, we included the time of contact as robustness check for 2016 and could not find any significant effect.
The study excluded the practices that did not offer a treatment at all or only offered it to private patients. In addition, we excluded all practices that were closed for more than a week or those that were not reached after three calls, respectively six calls if the line was busy. Finally, we omitted practices that did not accept new patients or did not offer fixed appointments.
Treatments were chosen for several reasons: all treatments can be considered elective rather than emergency treatments, but must be carried out by a specialist. Additionally, those treatments are not limited to a certain subpopulation, can be performed during a single visit and are relatively prominent among the population (see Lungen et al. 2008 ).
Statistical methods
In order to examine waiting times, we use bivariate as well as multivariate methods. Waiting times are defined as the number of working days between the phone call and the received appointment, adjusted for public holidays.
As a first step, we apply Wilcoxon rank sum tests to detect changes in waiting times. This non-parametric approach does not rely on the assumption of normally distributed waiting times and tests the null hypothesis that the median waiting time does not differ significantly between different groups. We assess potential differences between years, insurance status as well as a combination thereof. Additionally, we evaluate the results for each treatment individually to identify inherent heterogeneity.
The next step is to apply multivariate analysis. We model waiting times, using different specifications. Our base model is an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model with the logarithm of waiting time as dependent variable.
The logarithmic form is used to account for the characteristics of the data as waiting times are strictly non-negative and do not follow a normal distribution. Insurance status of patient i in practice p (SHI ip ) is included as main explanatory variable. We also include a time dummy (Year t ) to control for general trends between 2014 and 2016. In addition, an interaction of time dummy and insurance status ðYear t *SHI ip ) allows for non-parallel trends in waiting times between both insurance types. Furthermore, the type of treatment (i. e. exe examination, etc.) is included as control for the general estimations
β j * D j Þ, while waiting times are also estimated separately for each treatment.
Standard errors are clustered at the practice level to deal with serial correlation. Alternatively to this baseline specification, we also estimate a Fixed Effects (FE) model using practice fixed effects. Since specialties and thus offered treatments are practice-specific, no controls for treatments are necessary in the baseline FE model. Nonetheless, additional treatment-specific estimations are carried out as to evaluate whether results are heterogeneous over the range of practice specialties:
ln w it ð Þ= β 0 + β 1 * SHI it + β 2 * Year t + β 3 * ðYear t * SHI it Þ + α p + e it (2) Similar to Lungen et al. (2008) , we also fit an alternative model to deal with the count data character of waiting times. Thus, we estimate eq. (1) as a GLM negative binomial model with a log link function. Standard errors are likewise clustered at the practice level. We prefer the negative binomial model to a Poisson specification as the LR test gives evidence that our waiting times are overdispersed.
The implicit aim of the reform is to avoid waiting times above 4 weeks or 20 working days. For this reason, we also estimate the impact of insurance type on waiting times. Rather than using the number of working days to receive an appointment, we estimate the probability of obtaining an appointment with a waiting time longer than 20 working days:
In line with eq.
(1), we first estimate an OLS model. 5 As the dependent variable a dummy variable is employed that is 1 for waiting times above 20 working days and 0 otherwise. The same explanatory and control variables as in eq.
(1) are used and standard errors are again clustered at practice level. Besides, we estimate the probability of receiving an appointment in more than 20 working days using a Fixed Effects model in line with eq. (2):
Results
In total, 397 appointments were made, which accounts to a high overall inclusion rate of 77.4 % (see Table 1 ). The most important exclusion restrictions were unattainability of the practice (even after six calls), refusal of fixed appointments, vacation and the acceptance of only private patients. These reasons account for over 80 percent of exclusions. Generally, waiting times remained quite stable over time (see Table 2 ). In 2014, a patient had to wait roughly 20 days for an appointment; in 2016, average waiting 5 We focus on an OLS in order to obtain a meaningful interpretation of the interaction effect of our interest. As argued by Ai and Norton (2003) , a simple summary measure of the interaction effect is problematic in non-linear models because the effect and the sign of the interaction effect actually changes for each single observation (being dependent on the different values of the covariates). However, we also experiment using nonlinear models that lead to qualitatively equivalent results (results not shown and available upon request). time was 19 days. Bivariate analysis indicates that mean waiting times vary considerably between the insurance types. SHI patients face higher waiting times that persist over time -with the average waiting time increasing from 28 working days in 2014 to 31 working days in 2016. In contrast, privately insured patients' waiting time decreased significantly from 14 days in 2014 to 8 days in 2016. In relative terms, in 2014 SHI policy holders waited for an appointment on average twice as long as PHI holders; they had to wait almost 4 times as long in 2016. The differences between PHI and SHI policy holders were significant in both years. 6 We found strong variation in waiting times between treatments. In 2014, the longest waiting times were found for pulmonary function tests with an average waiting time of 46 working days in 2014 (SHI 54.4 days; PHI 26.0 days), which only slightly decreased to 45 days in 2016 (SHI 70.2 days; PHI 21.3 days). In contrast, an appointment for an audiometry only required a waiting time of eight days in 2014 (SHI 10.0 days; PHI 5.4 days), which fell to six days in 2016 (SHI 8.4 days; PHI 2.9). For all treatments waiting times for PHI patients decreased between 2014 and 2016 (significantly for audiometry, MRT of the knee and gastroscopy), whereas for SHI patients the pattern was heterogeneous with increasing waiting times for eye examination, allergy test and pulmonary function test and decreasing waiting times for audiometry and gastroscopy. For SHI holders all changes were statistically insignificant. In 2016, differences in waiting times between SHI and PHI policy holders were significant for all treatments. Table 3 Moreover, in line with the previous analysis, the analysis of the full sample (1) shows that SHI patients experienced significantly higher waiting times than PHI patients shown by the positive SHI coefficient. On average, SHI patients had 6 By including two calls, we double the sample size of this particular wave, leading to higher precision of the respective estimates. To ensure that potential significant effects are not caused by differences in sample sizes, we exclude the second calls of the 2016 wave. All results still remain robust if only one call per wave is considered and are available upon request. 7 Considering the negative value of the time trend, the combined effect of time trend and interaction term shows that waiting times for SHI policy holders stayed stable whereas private patients experienced decreasing waiting times. waiting times for SHI patients, ii) a reduction in waiting times for PHI patients and iii) a widening gap in waiting times between PHI and SHI patients also holds with a few exceptions for the different treatments. Moreover, the results are robust to the choice of model if coefficients and interactions are considered together. Even with inclusion of day of call and time of call (for wave 2016) as control variables, the results remain stable. Table A1 presents the results for alternative model specifications. Additionally, a second specification is included that models the probability of obtaining an appointment with a waiting time longer than 4 weeks (respectively 20 working days). The model shown in Panel B of Table 3 . Thus, the gap in waiting times of more than 4 weeks between SHI and PHI holders widened over time. Moreover, a higher share of SHI patients experienced waiting times of more than 4 weeks shown by the positive SHI coefficient. On average the share of patients who had to wait more than 4 weeks for an appointment was 16.3 % [exact computation: 100 (e (−0.178 )-1)] higher for SHI than for PHI policy holders. Besides, the share of PHI patients with waiting times of more than 4 weeks decreased over time by 13.1 % [exact computation: 100 (e (−0.141 )-1)]. The pattern for single treatments are qualitatively similar compared to the results for all treatments. However, it must be noted that, due to the low number of observations, results for single treatments lack statistical significance and must be considered with caution. Again, results are robust to alternative models specifications as shown in Table A1 . Figure 1 depicts the distribution of waiting times for both waves, combined as well as separated by insurance status of the patient. The variation of waiting times has slightly decreased. However, if a robust variance comparison test is applied, this change turns out insignificant as shown in Table A2 . The hypothesis that the variance of waiting times has not changed between 2014 and 2016 cannot be rejected at any significance level. In addition, Figure 1 shows that any trend of decreasing variation in waiting times is mainly driven by variance decrease for PHI patients. While the variance of waiting times has not changed between the waves for SHI patients, a slight decrease is found for PHI patients. These decreases in waiting times for PHI patients turn out to be significant and independent of the preferred test statistic.
Discussion and conclusion
The main objectives of this paper were to assess the impact of health insurance status on waiting times and to evaluate whether PHI holders obtain an appointment for specialized outpatient treatment faster than SHI holders. The paper additionally evaluated whether a reform that aimed at reducing excessive waiting times for SHI holders was associated with a reduction in waiting times. In this context, the development of waiting times in the year before (2014) and after the reform (2016) was assessed and checked for insurance-specific trends. Moreover, due to a similar experimental design, we were able to compare our findings to results obtained for 2006 by Lungen et al. (2008) and thus to describe the development of waiting times in Germany over a longer time period.
The results illustrate the importance of insurance status in obtaining an appointment at a specialized doctor; SHI holders were required to wait significantly longer to see a specialist for elective treatment than PHI holders. This is a well-established finding in the literature, internationally as well as in Germany. Thus, preferential treatment can be suspected.
In addition, we do not only find a considerable gap in waiting times with regard to insurance status, we also detect a widening of the gap over time. In Waiting Times for Outpatient Treatment comparison to 2006, waiting times generally increased. However, while this trend reversed between 2014 and 2016 for PHI holders, a further slight deterioration was found for SHI patients. In 2016, publicly insured patients had to wait nearly 4 times longer for an appointment compared to privately insured ones. Depending on the considered treatment, this ratio ranges between three times and 17 times. Although this preferential treatment raises concerns with regard to equal access to medical care, the results are in line with theoretical expectations. Differences in remuneration create incentives for physicians to discriminate in favor of PHI holders. This effect is further reinforced since private patients tend to be highly time sensitive.
Besides insurance status results vary greatly by the specialist's field. While pulmonary function tests required the longest waiting time ( Regarding the development of waiting times just before and after the reform we discovered that SHI patients face high waiting times that remain stable over time -with the average waiting time increasing from 28 working days in 2014 to 31 working days in 2016. In contrast, privately insured patients' waiting time decreased from 14 days in 2014 to 8 days in 2016. This result indicates that after the reform there is still unequal access to elective outpatient treatment depending on the patient's insurance status.
We also do not find a significant overall change in the distribution of waiting times before versus after the reform, but some slight differences in the development of waiting time dispersion by type of insurance. While there is less variation for PHI patients after the reform, no change can be seen for SHI patients. As previously explained, a potential indirect effect of the reform could be a decrease of excess demand and capacities. If so, we would expect less variation of waiting times. However, the results do not support this hypothesis. The variance decrease for PHI patients mainly stems from a further reduction of waiting times for these patients. In contrast, for SHI patients the results do not point towards any reduction of excess demand or capacities.
Our study has several limitations. First, comparisons of waiting times over the years might be restricted due to the problem of seasonality in the data. In 2014 the assessment period was in winter time (February 18 to 25) where there may have been an above average demand for outpatient care for different winter specific treatments (e. g. common cold, specific fractures). In contrast, in 2016 the assessment period was during holiday season (August 24 to October 14). Thus, due to vacation of specialists, in this period supply may have been lower. In sum, it is possible that different supply and demand levels in the assessment periods may have an impact on the results and the waiting time levels. However, it is not very plausible that seasonality issues can explain the widening gap in waiting times between SHI and PHI holders.
Second, we cannot evaluate the impact of the reform directly. Within the reform, a service hotline was initiated for patients unable to obtain an appointment within 4 weeks via the usual channels. It is rather unlikely that the decrease in waiting times for private patients is a direct result of the reform, because the hotline is only open to patients that could not obtain a appointment within 4 weeks. tSince PHI holders generally have much lower waiting times than 4 weeks, the reform does not apply to them. However, it is possible that the reform was able to spread appointments more evenly by reducing backlog at high-demand practices. Hence, some capacities could have been made available. As mentioned before, physicians have incentives to prefer private patients. Therefore, those capacities were possibly used to further prioritize PHI holders. The reduction in the distribution of waiting times for PHI patients before versus after the reform support this argumentation. However, we could only evaluate the potential reform impact indirectly. It is beyond the scope of this paper to attribute the change in waiting times fully to the reform or disentangle reform effects from general time trends. It is possible and would be in line with anecdotal evidence that the reform had no effect on SHI waiting times, and changes must be linked to other developments within the health care sector.
Third, the time between the introduction of the reform and our experiment is rather short (roughly 7 months). It can be argued that patients need time to get used to a new system and therefore potential effects can only be seen at a later point of time. We cannot exclude the possibility that positive effects of the reform had not yet unfolded at the time of evaluation.
Fourth, while we could demonstrate that members of private health insurance have better access to the system, this study has nothing to say about the consequences. It remains unclear how the health status of patients is affected by asymmetric waiting times. Fifth, the region in which the study was conducted is mainly urban and hence not representative for Germany or North RhineWestphalia. PHI holders are more likely to be prevalent in major cities such as Bonn, Cologne and Leverkusen than in less urban parts of Germany. However, the resulting bias remains unclear. Sixth, as population density and physician density are higher for the region Cologne, Leverkusen and Bonn compared to the average region in Germany, we cannot state that results are representative for Germany. Therefore, future research might investigate waiting times patterns by insurance type for other regions in Germany. Seventh, this study is limited to elective treatments. The scope of discrimination in case of emergencies, if it exists, is yet to be evaluated. Finally, we are not able to judge if preferential treatment is also mirrored by different qualities of care. These points, however, are important in order not only to examine the scope of inequity in the system but also its efficiency. 
